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Abstract
Traditionally, the United States has aspired to the operation of its industries in a system of
free enterprise. One of the oldest instances of government intervention in shipping - the cabotage
law- was designed to preserve for domestic vessels all trade between domestic points. Recently,
however, developments in maritime commerce have led United States courts to an examination of
cabotage legislation. The result has noticeably limited the scope of United States coast-wise laws.
Specifically, questions have arisen over: 1) the eligibility for coastwise trade of vessels which have
been reconstructed from parts of two other ships, 2) the application of cabotage legislation to cargo
which returns to the United States after having been processed or refined abroad,6 and 3) the entry
into coastwise trade of federally subsidized vessels. After discussing the purpose and scope of the
cabotage law, this Note will discuss these issues and their significance in the overall scheme of
United States shipping.

THE WEAKENING GRIP OF UNITED STATES
CABOTAGE LAW
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the United States has aspired to the operation of
its industries in a system of free enterprise. Yet today, the United
States shipping industry finds itself ensnared in an increasingly intricate set of domestic and international regulations. 1 One of the
oldest instances of government intervention in shipping 2-the cabotage law 3-was designed to preserve for domestic vessels all trade
4
between domestic points.
Recently, however, developments in maritime commerce have
led United States courts to an examination of cabotage legislation.
The result has noticeably limited the scope of United States coastwise laws. Specifically, questions have arisen over: 1) the eligibility
for coastwise trade of vessels which have been reconstructed from

1.

See generally G. JANTSCHER, BREAD UPON THE WATERS: FEDERAL AIDS TO

THE MARITIME INDUSTRIES (1975); Hearn, Cargo Preference and Control, 2 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 481 (1971); Morse, A Study of American Merchant Marine Legislation, 25
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 57 (1960); James, Some Current Developments in United
States Control of InternationalShipping, 7 INT'L LAW. 541 (1973); Note, Cargo Preference: The United States and the Future Regulation of International Shipping, 16
VA. J. INT'L L. 865 (1976). For examples of specific United States legislation, see
Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 810-842 (1976) (especially § 814, the provision
excluding liner conferences from United States antitrust laws, see Llorca, Anti-trust
Exemption of Shipping Conferences, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 287 (1975)); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1976) (vessel construction and operating
subsidy programs); Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1155 (1976)
(amendments to Merchant Marine Act of 1936, see Richardson, Capital Construction
Funds Under the Merchant Marine Act, 29 TAX L. REV. 751 (1974)).
2. Among the earliest laws passed by Congress was one which placed a discriminatory tax on foreign vessels operating in the coastwise trade. Act of July 20,
1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 27.
3. Cabotage is defined as "coasting-trade so that it means navigating and trading along the coast between the ports thereof." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (5th
ed. 1979) (emphasis in original). A similar cabotage provision restricts the use of foreign aircraft between United States destinations. 49 U.S.C. § 17 6(c) (1976).
4. The chief legislation in the United States concerning this reservation is 46
U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979).
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parts of two other ships, 5 2) the application of cabotage legislation
to cargo which returns to the United States after having been processed or refined abroad, 6 and 3) the entry into coastwise trade of
federally subsidized vessels. 7 After discussing the purpose and
scope of the cabotage law, this Note will discuss these issues and
their significance in the overall scheme of United States shipping.
I.

NATURE OF CABOTAGE LAW

The United States Congress has long recognized the need to
shield the domestic merchant marine from foreign competition. 8
Originally, in the face of the dominance enjoyed by Britain on the
seas, this protection was aimed at simply permitting the United
States to develop a merchant marine. 9 More recently, Congress
has maintained protectionist legislation because the cost of constructing vessels in United States shipyards and operating them
with United States crews is substantially higher than comparative
foreign costs. 10 Additionally, the governments of most seafaring nations supply their national merchant marines with generous subsidies. x" Quite obviously, the United States merchant marine would
5. Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1020 (1970).
6. American Maritime Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979).
7. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572 (1980), rev'g sub
nom. Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Kreps, 595 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8. See, e.g., Act of March 1, 1817, ch. 31, § 4, 3 Stat. 351 (outright prohibition of
foreign vessels from United States coastwise trade); Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, § 3, 1
Stat. 27 (tax on foreign vessels operating in the United States coastwise trade); Act of
July 4, 1789, ch. 2, § 5, 1 Stat. 27 (reduction of duty on goods imported on United
States owned vessels).
9. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 963 (2d ed. 1975).
10. Id. at 968-70. Operating costs on United States flag vessels traditionally
have been double those of vessels sailing under Liberian or Panamanian registries.
B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 2 n.5 (1962); see, e.g., Ship Transfers to Foreign Flag: Hearings on S. 1488 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine &
Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 104-05 (1957). See also Farrell Lines Inc. v. United States, 499 F.2d 587 (Ct.
Cl. 1974). Both the Dept. of Commerce and shipowners have "developed elaborate
systems for estimating the foreign cost . . . of a proposed ship. One method ... is to
obtain . . . information on the costs of the myriad components of the ship in the foreign shipbuilding center. From this data they compute a hypothetical low bid for
their ship ....
" Moore-McCormack Lines Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568, 572
(Ct. Cl. 1969).
11. For a review of the maritime subsidies of other nations, as well as those of
the United States, see MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
MARITIME SUBSIDIES (1978).
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be swept from the seas without some governmental aid designed to
reduce this competitive imbalance.
Congress has insisted that a viable merchant marine is a requisite for both commercial and defensive purposes.1 2 Consequently,
the protective umbrella erected for United States shipping has a
dual nature. First, cabotage specifically requires that a vessel be
built in a United States shipyard, be owned by United States citizens and be manned by a United States crew in order to gain enrollment, 13 which is the permission to engage in domestic coastwise commerce.14 Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920,15 known as the Jones Act, 16 provides for the forfeiture of any
cargo transported between United States domestic points by
17
unenrolled vessels.
Second, Congress has established several subsidy programs
which enable United States flag vessels engaged only in foreign
trade to compete effectively with carriers registered abroad. 1 8 Specifically, the Merchant Marine Act of 193619 permitted the government to contribute up to 50% of the construction costs for vessels
needed in the United States foreign merchant fleet.2 0 The act also
requires that those vessels which received such a constructiondifferential subsidy (CDS) refrain from competing in the United
States coastwise trade unless they fall within one of two statutory
12. See Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (preamble) (1976). The
United States seeks to "have a merchant marine of ... vessels sufficient to carry the
greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary .
Id.
See generally W. GORTER, UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICY (1977).
13. 46 U.S.C. §§ 11, 252 (1976). The Commissioner of Customs is responsible
for making rulings and regulations on vessel activity in the coastwise trade. Id. § 2.
Enrollment is not to be confused with registration, which is the documentation required in order to participate in foreign trade under the United States flag. Id. § 11.

14. Id. § 252.
15. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979).
16. Id. The "Jones Act" is also a name often ascribed to Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (concerning liability for injuries to
seamen). For the purposes of this Note, however, the "Jones Act" refers only to section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. For a concise history of section 27, see
Lowry, Jones Act, 40 ICC PRAc. J. 779 (1973).
17. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979).
18. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1976); see notes
91-95 infra and accompanying text.

19. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1976).
20. Id. § 1152(b). The considerations which go into determining whether a vessel is needed in the United States foreign merchant fleet are found at 46 U.S.C. §
1171(a)(1) (1976). For an analysis of this section, see 1978 DuKE L. J. 252; 18 VA. J.
INT'L L. 359 (1978).

394

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:391

exceptions. 2 1 In order for a vessel to take advantage of either exception, its owners must make a proportional repayment of the
22
subsidy to the government.

Thus, the United States merchant marine can be divided into
two separately protected groups: 1) the "Jones Act Fleet," which
enjoys freedom from competition by foreign and government subsidized vessels, while high operating expenses prevent it from soliciting any worldwide trade, and 2) the subsidized foreign trade
fleet, which is in a position to compete with foreign vessels, but is
statutorily barred from coastwise activities. The necessity of such
an arrangement has gone largely undebated, 2 3 and, in fact, disputes over United States cabotage legislation have only occasionally
reached the courts. 24 Largely due to the era of the super-tanker
and the opening of the Alaskan oil slopes, however, several major
cabotage issues have emerged which have required judicial resolu25
tion.

21. 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1976). For a discussion of this government subsidy program, see Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States, 413 F.2d 568 (Ct. Cl.
1969). For general discussions on the effect of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 46
U.S.C. §§ 1151-1155, see Blackwell, Implementation of the Merchant Marine Act of
1970, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 167 (1974); Bowman, The Merchant Marine Act of 1970,
2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 715 (1971).
22. For a description of these exceptions, see note 106 infra and accompanying
text.
23. Cabotage restriction is a principle generally agreed upon among the world's
major maritime powers. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 187 (8th ed. 1955).
At present, twenty-two seafaring nations have enacted cabotage statutes. These are:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, India, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela.
The notable exception is Great Britain. Komarow, Foreign Cargo Vessels in the
Coastwise Oil Trade, 10 J. MAR. L. & COM. 271, 271 n.2 (1979). For a discussion of
coastwise law in relation to German public policy, see Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1279-81 (5th Cir. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Central Vt. Transp. Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S. 33 (1935) (denial of
coastwise privileges to a vessel owned by a Canadian corporation); Gillentine v.
McKeand, 426 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1970) (barring renationalized vessels from operating
in the coastwise passenger trade); United States v. 1500 Cords, More or Less,
Jackpine Pulpwood, 204 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1953) (transport of logs by a Canadian tug
within a United States harbor did not violate cabotage law); Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co. v. Ludwig, 486 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (dredging activities are not
considered coastwise activities); United States v. 12,536 Gross Tons of Whale Oil Ex
The Charles Racine, 29 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Va. 1939) (constantly changing points are
not included within the cabotage restriction).
25. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
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II.

REBUILT VESSELS

One of the more complex problems arising under cabotage
legislation concerns the "jumboizing" of vessels.2 6 Such a procedure involves the rebuilding of a ship by connecting components of
two or more vessels to create a larger ship. If such a ship then attempts to enter the coastwise trade, the heritage of those components becomes crucially significant. This was at the heart of Marine
Carrier Corp. v. Fowler,2 7 a case in which the owners of the
jumboized vessel OBSERVER attempted to gain for it coastwise
privileges. The Commisioner of Customs, however, ruled that the
OBSERVER was ineligible for enrollment, 28 and the owners' appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury resulted in an affirmation of
that ruling.2 9 In the resulting court battle the district court held in
favor of the OBSERVER;3 0 however, the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded for further fact finding.31
The ancestry of the OBSERVER is quite detailed, yet merits
discussion because it makes clear the problem of jumboizing 3 2 The
tanker WAPELLO, one of the OBSERVER's earliest ancestors,
was constructed in a United States shipyard for Panamanian owners
in 1953. It was subsequently dismembered, and in a Japanese shipyard its forebody was attached to the stern of the tanker ESSO
CHITTAGONG, a United States-built vessel also of Panamanian
ownership and registry. The result of the pairing was the Liberian
registered SANTA HELENA. That ship was itself dismembered,
and its forebody, previously that of the WAPELLO, was attached,
in a United States shipyard, to the stem of the enrolled vessel
TRUSTCO. The offspring from this coupling, was christened the
OBSERVER.
As already indicated, in order to enjoy coastwise privileges, a
26. Shipowners have made "ingenious efforts to rebuild, modernize, and enlarge qualified vessels without losing the favored Jones Act status." Lowry, supra
note 16, at 784 (footnotes omitted). The difficulty arises in "distinguishing the donor
from the donee." Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 709 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1970).
27. 429 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1970).
28. 429 F.2d at 704.
29. Id. at 704-05.
30. 305 F. Supp. 984, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
31. 429 F.2d 702, 710 (2d Cir. 1970).
32. This history of the OBSERVER is a paraphrasing of the district court's own
discussion. See 305 F. Supp. at 985.
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vessel must meet several criteria. 33 It must be of United States
construction and ownership. Furthermore, if two vessels were entitled to enrollment, their progeny most certainly would also possess
this right. 34 In the case of the OBSERVER, however, debate arose
as to whether one parent, the SANTA HELENA, possessed coastwise privileges. Several of the provisos 35 added to the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 caused the status of the WAPELLO, and subsequently that of the OBSERVER, to be disputed.
The first proviso mandates that once a vessel has forfeited its
right to engage in coastwise trading by being sold to a foreigner, it
may never recapture that privilege. It states:
[N]o vessel having at any time acquired the lawful right to engage in the coastwise trade, either by virtue of having been built
in, or documented under the laws of the United States, and later
sold foreign in whole, or in part, or placed under foreign registry, shall hereafter acquire the right to engage in the coastwise

trade

.... 36

The first question then, becomes whether the WAPELLO ever
possessed that coastwise privilege. If it did not, it obviously could
never have forfeited it. 37 Both the district and circuit courts saw
this initial problem as one of interpretation of the statute's rather
ambiguous wording. 38 The Second Circuit noted that "[t]he first
33. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
34. 429 F.2d at 705. The court stated that "[tihe TRUSTCO's eligibility for
coastwise trade was not subject to question . . . . [i]f the WAPELLO, and a fortiori
its forebody, were also eligible, it would follow that the OBSERVER .. .was entitled to coastwise trading privileges." Id. (emphasis in original).
35. Eight provisos, together with amendments, have been added to the Jones
Act. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979). These are: Nov. 16, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-112,
§ 4, 93 Stat. 848; Oct. 3, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, tit. II, § 213, 92 Stat. 904; Nov. 23,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-163, § 1, 85 Stat. 486; Aug. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-474, 82
Stat. 700; Sept. 21, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-194, 79 Stat. 823; July 5, 1960, Pub. L. No.
86-583, § 1, 74 Stat. 321; July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 27(a), 72 Stat. 351; July
14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 714, ch. 600, § 1, 70 Stat. 544; 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 21, §§ 204,
306, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3178, 64 Stat. 1276, 1277; June 29, 1936, ch.
858, §§ 204, 904, 49 Stat. 1987; July 2, 1935, ch. 355, § 1, 49 Stat. 442; Apr. 11, 1935,
ch. 58, 49 Stat. 154; Ex. Ord. No. 6166, § 12, June 10, 1933. For a general discussion
of pre-1979 provisos, see Komarow, supra note 23, at 276-85; Lowry, supra note 16,
at 784-89.
36. Act of July 2, 1935, ch. 355, § 1, 49 Stat. 442 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 883
(Supp. III 1979)).
37. 429 F.2d at 706.
38. 305 F. Supp. at 987; 429 F.2d at 706.
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phrase seems to suggest that the proviso applies only to those vessels sold foreign after having acquired the full legal right to engage
in the coastwise trade; the second phrase, that it applies to all ves39
sels sold foreign after having been built in the United States."
The district court decided that the first phrase was operative,
and thus held that the WAPELLO would have been eligible for
domestic trading.4 0 Consequently, it ruled that the OBSERVER,
the offspring of two legitimate traders, was likewise fit for enroll41
ment.
The Second Circuit rejected this holding and based its decision on the proviso's legislative history. As the court noted, both
the Senate and House Committee Reports specifically named two
classes of vessels to which the proviso was directed: " '1. Vessels
built in or documented under the laws of the United States and
later sold to foreign owners,' " and " '2. Vessels built in the United
States for foreign countries or foreign purchasers.' "42 The
WAPELLO falls directly into the second category. Such specific
legislative intent, coupled with the usual statutory scheme of protectionist legislation, 4 3 convinced the court that the WAPELLO
had indeed surrendered its right to coastwise trade. 44 Thus, in order to reconcile the proviso's conflicting language, the circuit court
decided that a vessel built in the United States acquires a right to
participate in domestic trade, conditioned upon its ownership by a
United States citizen. 4 5 If, as in the WAPELLO's case, it is sold to
a foreigner, even if it was never previously enrolled, the vessel ir46
revocably loses its coastwise trading privileges.
Having determined the WAPELLO's domestic ineligibility,
the Second Circuit had to rule on the rights of a vessel created by
39. 429 F.2d at 706.
40. 305 F. Supp. at 988.
41. Id.
42. 429 F.2d at 707, quoting S. REP. No. 870, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935);
H.R. REP. No. 118, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
43. See generally Morse, supra note 1, at 62.
44. 429 F.2d at 708. The Second Circuit stated:
In sum, we are of the view that the first proviso to § 27 [of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920] must be interpreted as a coherent whole and that we
must give recognition to the expressed intent of Congress, and the purposes
of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we are led to the conclusion that the
WAPELLO could not engage in the coastwise trade.

Id.
45. Id. at 707.
46. Id.
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the joining of one eligible and one ineligible tanker. Important to
this evaluation was the second proviso to section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.4 7 It forbids a rebuilt vessel's entry into

the coastwise trade unless the entire rebuilding, including construction of any major components of the hull or superstructure,
48
takes place within the United States.
This exception was relevant because the OBSERVER must be
considered a rebuilt ship rather than a new one. 49 The question remained whether it was a rebuilt SANTA HELENA, which contributed the WAPELLO's forebody to the OBSERVER, or a rebuilt
TRUSTCO. If it was a rebuilt SANTA HELENA, the second proviso deprived it of coasting privileges because the SANTA HELENA's own rebuilding had taken place in Japan. Similarly, the first
proviso would also deny it enrollment because of the SANTA
HELENA's own tainted lineage (the WAPELLO). 50 On the other
hand, the OBSERVER would have enjoyed coastwise rights if it
51
was a rebuilt TRUSTCO.
With the central issue now being which ship bequeathed its
personality to the OBSERVER, the Second Circuit decided that
this is a matter requiring determination at trial.52 Accordingly, it
remanded the case to the district court. 53
47. Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 714, ch. 600, § 1, 70 Stat. 544, as amended
by Act of July 5, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-583, § 1, 74 Stat. 321 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §
883 (Supp. III 1979)). The proviso states:
[N]o vessel of more than five hundred gross tons which has acquired the
lawful right to engage in the coastwise trade, by virtue of having been built
in or documented under the laws of the United States, and which has later
been rebuilt shall have the right thereafter to engage in the coastwise trade
unless the entire rebuilding, including the construction of any major components of the hull or superstructure of the vessel, is effected within the
United States, its Territories (not including trust territories), or its possessions ....
48. Id.
49. The Second Circuit pointed out that the OBSERVER necessarily cannot be
defined as a new ship; otherwise, a shipowner could attach the stern of one ineligible ship to the forebody of another, and vice-versa. He would thereby create two
"new" ships eligible for the coastwise trade, whereas none had existed before. The
result would be in direct conflict with the statutory intent of United States cabotage
laws. See 429 F.2d at 709.
50. 429 F.2d at 709.

51.

Id.

52. Id. at 710.
53. Id. The case was never retried in the district court. Appellant, Marine Carriers, had two vessels which possessed both enrolled and unenrolled parts. One, the
SEAFARE, was sold after the Second Circuit decision. The OBSERVER, meanwhile,
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The primary significance of Fowler is the importance of ancestral purity for jumboized vessels seeking coastwise privileges, and
the ease with which the first proviso may strip a vessel of its conditional right to that privilege. Significantly, though, no such condition exists with respect to the second proviso. In other words, although an entire vessel may lose its domestic trading rights, its
parts are not similarly barred. Thus, if it was decided that the OBSERVER was a rebuilt TRUSTCO, the fact that its forebody came
from the tainted SANTA HELENA in no way flaws its enrollment
54
claim.
The issue remains undecided, however, as to which rebuilt
vessel the OBSERVER actually was. Protracted expert testimony
will be necessary to determine whether a rebuilt vessel's forebody,
which comprises most of its length, or its stem, which is the more
valuable part, dominates its heritage. 55 If construction of jumboized super-tankers continues, this is a problem with which courts
must ultimately grapple.
III.

ALTERED CARGO AND COASTWISE SHIPPING

Encompassed within the Jones Act is a prohibition against the
transshipment of goods; that is, cargo cannot be shipped from a domestic point to a foreign port, and then fowarded directly back to
another domestic point unless vessels on both legs of the journey
are enrolled. 56 This prohibition stems from the result in United
States v. 250 Kegs of Nails,5 7 after which Congress added the
words, "either directly or via a foreign port," 58 to the original cabo60
tage statute. 59 In that case, the court strictly applied the statute,
which simply banned the shipment of cargo from one domestic
point to another on a foreign vessel. Therefore, 250 kegs of nails
was stranded in the Suez Canal during hostilities between Egypt and Israel in 1970.
It was not returned to its owners until a 1976 dredging of the Canal. Marine Carriers,
therefore, did not pursue the case as the issue had become moot because of the vessel's damaged condition. Telephone conservation with Robert Corbett, counsel for
appellants (Feb. 23, 1981).
54. 429 F.2d at 708 n.5.
55. Id. at 710.
56. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979).
57. 61 F. 410 (9th Cir. 1894).
58. Act of Feb. 15, 1893, ch. 117, 27 Stat. 455 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §
883 (Supp. III 1979)).
59. Act of March 1, 1817, § 4, 3 Stat. 351, as amended by Act of July 18, 1866, §
20, 14 Stat. 182.
60. 61 F. at 411.
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which were sent from New York to Antwerp on a Belgian ship, and
then were reshipped to California on a British ship, were not subject to forfeiture. 6 ' The court's emphasis was on the continuity of
the voyage, which it saw to be disrupted by the Antwerp stopover. 6 2 This decision pointed out the ease with which all the carefully constructed protection for the United States Merchant Marine
could be circumvented. The new phrase "either directly or via a
63
foreign port," was Congress' answer.
Although the amended statute removed one problem, new
questions naturally emerged. Despite 250 Kegs, the shipper's intent has traditionally been the controlling element in determining
whether his cargo was on a continuous voyage. 64 Thus, if he sent
goods to a foreign port with the anticipation of reshipping them directly back to the United States, he could be held in violation of
coastwise law. 65 Increased Alaskan oil trade has prompted one cir66
cuit to reevaluate this test.
In American Maritime Ass'n v. Blumenthal6 7 the Hess Corporation decided to transport crude oil in foreign flag tankers from
Valdez, Alaska to its refinery in the Virgin Islands. 68 The refined
products would then be shipped to points on the United States
east coast, 6 9 again in foreign vessels. The problem for the court
was determining whether such activity amounted to two distinct
voyages, or one voyage subject to the Jones Act.
Both the district and circuit courts concluded that Hess' action
was not a Jones Act violation.7 0 The district court found that eleven
different products result from the refining of crude oil, 7 ' and this
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 414.
Id. at 411.
See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
The Bermuda, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1865). See also The Peterhoff, 72 U.S.

(5 Wall.) 28 (1866).
65. See 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 350, 351 (1920). This intent was deemed to be a
question of fact. If such intent were attributable to the shipper, his cargo was subject
to forfeiture. Id. at 362-63.
66. American Maritime Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 590 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
67. 590 F.2d 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1978), aff'g, 458 F. Supp. 849 (D.D.C. 1977).
68. The Virgin Islands are not embraced within the United States cabotage
law. 46 U.S.C. § 877 (1976).
69. 590 F.2d at 1161. At that time, Alaskan oil could not be exported except under certain prescribed circumstances. Id. at n.9. See Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-52, § 110 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406 (Supp. III 1979)).
70. 458 F. Supp. at 863; 590 F.2d at 1165.
71. 458 F. Supp. at 862. The refining of Alaskan crude oil yields the following
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"conclusively demonstrates that the products of the Hess refinery
'72
are new and different merchandise from the Alaskan crude oil. "
Thus, Hess' activities added up to much more than simple trans73
shipment, and the coastwise laws remained undisturbed.
On appeal, the American Maritime Association insisted that
continuity within the meaning of the Jones Act was violated, regardless of the change these goods underwent because of Hess' ul74
timate intent that its fuel products be sent to the United States.
Further, it argued that in this particular instance, the goods did
not so lose their identity that they qualified as different merchandise. 75 In addressing these two arguments, the District of Columbia Circuit arrived at what could prove to be a troubling conclu76
sion.
77
The court saw the case as one of strict statutory application,
and reduced the problem to the nature of the goods. 78 Since "[n]o
merchandise shall be transported . . . between points in the
United States . . . in [foreign vessels]," 79 if the merchandise leaving the Virgin Islands was not the same cargo as that which entered, the Jones Act was inapplicable.8 0
The court refused to apply the intent test, and stated that "under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it is not the intent
of a shipper to send goods to a final destination that governs, but
the degree to which the goods are altered in fact in the course of
commercial dealings." 8' Admittedly, the court restricted its decision to the facts before it; however, if the alteration test is given
products in per cent volume: No. 6 Oil (55.82); No. 2 Oil (14.50); jet fuel (8.70); gasoline (4.19); premium gasoline (4.19); unleaded gasoline (3.00); toluene (2.23); paraxylene (1.08); benzene (.47); sulfur pellets (.30); xylene (.27). Id.
72. Id. at 863.
73. Id.
74. 590 F.2d at 1164.
75. Id. at 1162.
76. See notes 81-89 infra and accompanying text.
77. 590 F.2d at 1161.
78. Id.
79. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979).
80. 590 F.2d at 1163.
81. Id. at 1164 (emphasis in original). The court also noted that in construing
the predecessor statute to the Jones Act, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. 250
Kegs of Nails, 61 F. 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1894), emphasized that the ultimate purpose of
the parties meant little if they had actually complied with the letter of the law. 590
F.2d at 1164 n.39. 250 Kegs would hardly seem a worthwhile case on which to rely
since its result immediately prompted an adverse congressional response. See notes
57-63 supra and accompanying text.
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wide utility, an entire array of new problems may unfold within
the shipping industry.
Specifically, an alteration rather than an intent test may give
shippers unabashed liberty to undertake activity that would attenuate Congress' protectionist shipping policies. Industrialists could
conduct all manner of manufacturing, processing, and refining activities at points outside the embrace of cabotage 82 with the view
towards gaining the availability of foreign shipping.8 3 The court
noted that much of the world's economy is based on both United
84
States exports and the vast United States consumer market.
Therefore, it would be senseless to prohibit from transport in foreign vessels goods which might originate as United States raw materials, then become processed abroad, and finally go on sale to the
United States public.8 5 Nevertheless, the bare alteration test seems
to dismantle part of Congress' protectionist scheme, and could
pave the way to a weakening of the United States merchant maine.
More suitable would be a combined intent/alteration test.
Then, for example, if a shipper were sending products abroad for
what, under judicial determination, appeared to be no other reason
than circumvention of cabotage law, he could be thwarted. A chain
of connection test, which would blend features of both the intent
and alteration test, is perhaps the best alternative. To illustrate, regard two hypotheticals:
First, a United States mining outfit sells its ore to a Canadian
steel manufacturer. In turn, this manufacturer sells its steel to a
Japanese auto maker. The company then exports automobiles to
the United States for sale. It is clear that the ore has undergone
vast changes and the original mining firm has lost all control over
its ore upon the initial sale. Thus, under this suggested chain of
connection test, the autos should not be subject to the Jones Act.
82. In addition to foreign lands, several United States points enjoy some form
of protection from the Jones Act. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 877 (1976) (Virgin Islands); Id.
§ 1664 (Guam, Tutuila, Wake, Midway and Kingman Reef); 48 U.S.C. § 1664 (1976)
(American Samoa).
83. Unsubsidized United States shipping costs significantly more than foreign
freightage. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
84. 590 F.2d at 1168. The court cited appellee's brief in noting that the total
value of United States foreign commerce involved in round trip processing and manufacturing was nearly six billion dollars in 1976. Id. at n.62.
85. Id. at 1168-69.
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Second, a United States paper manufacturer harvests a crop of
trees, ships them to a plant in Canada where they are processed
into an array of paper products, and then controls the return of the
goods to the United States for sale. Although a piece of paper is no
more a tree than sulfur pellets are crude oil,8 6 cabotage restrictions
should apply to the paper's entry into the United States. The original manufacturer maintained his connections to and control over
the product, and despite its change of character, his ultimate intentions are quite clear. An additional feature of this test might well
be a requirement that a certain percentage of the original cargo return to the United States in order for the shipper to be subject to
s
the Jones Act. 87
This chain of connection analysis would also ease a second
problem the circuit court created for itself in Blumenthal. As
stated, the appellants claimed that the Alaskan crude oil had not
undergone sufficient alteration to escape the clutches of cabotage.
The court disagreed, though, due to the eleven different products
emerging from crude oil. It is unclear, however, where the line is
to be drawn in assessing change. The court noted that "the precise
point at which a substance subjected to an altering process becomes 'different' eludes simple definition; attempts at a universal
description would lead into metaphysical realms which a court
should fear to enter."'8 The court nevertheless felt that the case
represented a clear choice, so that it could easily determine that
89
Alaskan crude oil had been transformed.
After noting the complexities of the issue, the court's conclusion is somewhat puzzling. For the reasons the court itself acknowledged, simple change of the goods' condition is a wholly
unsatisfactory test in gauging the application of coastwise law. Although it has useful elements, the test is best augmented by the
traditional notion of intent.
86. See note 71 supra.
87. This test is apparently similar to that used by the Attorney General when
he ruled that the transportation of fish from an Alaskan port to Vancouver, and then
on to United States points was a violation of cabotage law. In this case, the shipper
knew that 1) Vancouver was not the product's final destination, and 2) that a certain
percentage of the fish would be forwarded to the United States. This ruling was
made despite the fact that the fish were stored and dried in a bonded warehouse for
four months to a year in Vancouver. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 350 (1920).
88. 590 F.2d at 1163 n.3 7 .
89. Id. at 1162-63.
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IV. SUBSIDIZED VESSELS IN COASTWISE TRADE
The United States has subsidized the construction of vessels in
United States shipyards and the cost of manning those ships with
United States crews in order to maintain a competitive merchant
marine in foreign commerce. 90 Administered by the Department of
Commerce, the Merchant Marine Act of 193691 includes in this
network of aid operating subsidies;9 2 acquisition of new and recon94
ditioned vessels for charter or sale; 93 a loan guarantee program;
and the construction-differential subsidy (CDS) program, 95 around
96
which raged a recent storm.
Controversy erupted over the CDS of 27.2 million dollars that
the Maritime Subsidy Board 9 7 approved for Seatrain Shipbuilding.9 Seatrain, under contract to Polk Tanker Corporation, constructed the 225,000 deadweight ton super-tanker, the
STUYVESANT, and, as stipulated in the subsidy agreement, the
parties agreed not to enter the vessel into the coastwise trade except as statutorily provided.9 9 By the time the vessel was completed in 1977, however, demand for tankers on the world market
90. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1976).
91. Id. For a short discussion of the available provisions under this act, see
Morse, A Review of the Assistance Provided to the American Merchant Marine Under Statutes of the United States and Their Administration by the Federal Maritime
Board and the Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 18 FED. B.
J. 355, 358-59 (1958).
92. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1176 (1976). For a discussion of the government's operating-differential subsidy, see Whitehurst, The Merchant Marine Act of 1936: An
Operational Subsidy in Retrospect, 8 J. L. & ECON. 223 (1965).
93. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1194 (1976).
94. Id. §§ 1271-1280.
95. Id. §§ 1151-1156.
96. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572 (1980), rev'g sub
nom. Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Kreps, 595 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For a detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion, see Bloom, Repayment of
Construction-DifferentialSubsidies, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 183 (1980). For an analysis of the D.C. Circuit Court's opinion, see 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417 (1979); 4
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 225 (1980).
97. The Maritime Subsidy Board actually approves all subsidy contracts. 46
C.F.R. §§ 201.1, 251.1 (1980). This Board is a component of the Maritime Administration, which in turn is part of the Department of Commerce.
98. In addition to the CDS program, the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce had advanced to Seatrain five million dollars as
a direct loan and had guaranteed 90% of 82 million dollars in loans from other
sources to help finance modernization and operation of its Navy Yard facilities and
an on the job training program for employees. 595 F.2d at 819-20.
99. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
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had dramatically declined. 10 0 Thus, Polk sought to enter the
STUYVESANT into the newly opened Alaskan oil trade, which
lacked sufficient numbers of tankers because of the Jones Act's prohibition of foreign vessels on domestic routes. 101
Upon petition by Polk and Seatrain to the Secretary of Commerce, the restriction was lifted because the Secretary felt that: 1)
there were no other employment opportunities for the STUYVESANT, 2) the contract which Seatrain had already negotiated for
transporting Alaskan oil would strengthen the collateral securing
obligations the government had guaranteed, 3) the contract might
prevent default on those obligations, and 4) the failure to lift restrictions might jeopardize Seatrain's survival. l0 2 In exchange,
Seatrain had to repay the entire amount of the subsidy, which it
was willing to do with twenty-year promissory notes.
United States shipping interests10 3 sought to bar this action,
claiming the Secretary lacked power to effect such a release. They
also claimed that had the Secretary possessed such authority, it was
inapplicable in the case of the STUYVESANT. 10 4 The District of
Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court disagreed sharply in
their statutory interpretations of section 506 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,105 with the Supreme Court ultimately deciding
06
that the Secretary possessed such power.1
Section 506 provides two explicit exceptions to the coastwise
trading ban applicable to subsidized vessels. Congress permitted
100. This reduction was a direct result of the oil production slowdown
undertaken by OPEC. 444 U.S. at 576.
101. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. III 1979). See also MARITIME ASS'N OF THE
UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ASSESSMENT OF ALASKAN CRUDE OIL

(Aug. 8, 1979) (suggesting an insufficient tanker capacity to handle Alaskan production).
102. Letter of James S. Dawson, Secretary of Maritime Administration, to Polk
Tanker Corp. (Aug. 31, 1977). See 444 U.S. at 581. In fact, as of this writing, Seatrain
Lines, Inc. the parent of Seatrain Shipbuilding, is facing possible bankruptcy and reorganization. It is attempting to remain a viable business by making favorable arrangements with its creditors. Operations have already been suspended, however, at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, the site of the STUYVESANT construction. N.Y. Times, Feb.
10, 1981, at D5, col. 3.
103. The original plaintiffs were Alaskan Bulk Carriers, Inc. and Shell Oil Co.,
both of which possessed enrolled tankers engaged on Alaskan oil routes. 595 F.2d at
814.
104. 444 U.S. at 579-80.
105. 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1976).
106. 444 U.S. at 597.
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ships to carry domestic cargo on one leg of certain foreign voyages,
and permitted vessels to engage in domestic trade for six months
or less in any one year upon a finding that such action would be
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the chapter.
In order not to prejudice unsubsidized vessels, Congress required
that any CDS ship entering domestic trade, under the latter provision, repay that portion of the outstanding subsidy allocable to the
10 7
vessel's coastwise activities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided that these two specific exceptions framed the
limit of the Secretary's power regarding entry of subsidized vessels
into the coastal trade. In effect, the court viewed the expansive
powers given the Secretary under the rest of the act as immaterial.o10 The court saw that such specificity limited the Secretary's
authority to amend construction-differential contracts and his discretion to administer the act. 10 9
The Supreme Court overruled this holding. It saw section 506
as a simple mandate that vessels wishing to move in and out of
coastwise trading could do so only under the circumstances precisely defined in the act.1 10 Thus, the Court reasoned, the statute
was addressing only temporary releases. 11 ' Permanent releases,
such as the type sought by the STUYVESANT, are not, therefore,
necessarily prohibited by the statute. 112 A permanent release
would forever locate a vessel in the "Jones Act Fleet," 113 thereby
permitting it no unfair advantage-such as those possessed by a
vessel moving freely between the subsidized and unsubsidized
fleets. 114 Where repayment of the subsidy includes an amount
equal to capital costs which would have been met had no subsidy
been available, 115 a CDS vessel entering the coastal trade enjoys
no competitive edge. Consequently, the Supreme Court found
107. 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1976).
108. Alaska Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Kreps, 595 F.2d at 836; see 46 U.S.C. § 1117
(1976). This section expressly permits the Secretary to make and amend CDS contracts.
109. See 595 F.2d at 834-35.
110. 444 U.S. at 588.

111.
112.
113.

Id.

Id. at 589-90.
See pt. I supra.
114. 444 U.S. at 588-89.
115. The Court noted that the Secretary was intending to apply a reasonable interest rate to the original subsidy amount. This is primarily designed to protect the
interests of the unsubsidized fleet. 444 U.S. at 589 n.31.
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nothing in section 506 barring a permanent release from a CDS
16
contract. 1
Both the District of Columbia Circuit and Supreme Court investigated the legislative history of section 506 in arriving at their
conflicting conclusions. As originally enacted, the section provided
for three releases from subsidy restrictions: 1) incidental tasks in
domestic trade requiring a pro rata subsidy repayment, 2) permanent releases requiring full repayment of the amortized portion of
the subsidy, and 3) emergency situations requiring no repayment. 11 7 In 1938, however, section 506 was rewritten into its current form." 8 Two changes were made that resulted in the elimination of the language concerning permanent releases and an
alteration in the emergency provision to require a pro rata subsidy
repayment. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that this
evidenced Congress' clear intention to remove permanent releases
from the list of exceptions. 1 19 The Supreme Court, however,
relying on the amendment's legislative history,' 2 0 believed that
Congress was trying only to clarify some ambiguities in the statute,
and sought to effect no substantial changes. 12 1 The Court concluded: "What does seem clear is that [the 1938 amendment] did
not represent a considered congressional judgment that the
permanent-release/full repayment transaction before us should be
prohibited. "122 Thus, subsidized vessels will be permitted into the
coastwise trade upon a full subsidy repayment.
116. Id. at 595.
117. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 506, 49 Stat. 1999. Compare this
section and its three explicit exceptions with the current version, amended in 1938,
46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1976). See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
118. 46 U.S.C. § 1156 (1976).
119. 595 F.2d at 829.
120. 444 U.S. at 595-96. The House Report stated that "[n]o fundamental
change in the original purpose of this section has been effected." H.R. REP. No.
2168, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1938). The Senate Report identifies the major significance of the changes as making unmistakably clear the owner's obligation to repay
his subsidy if he wishes to enter coastwise trade. S. REP. No. 1618, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 12-43 (1938).
121. The Court additionally noted that the United States Comptroller General
had permitted the GRACE LINE back into the coastwise trade upon full repayment
of its subsidy. This vessel had been converted, under subsidy, from a domestic cargo
ship into a container vessel equipped for foreign trade. Id. at 595. See Grace Line
Inc., 44 Comp. Gen. 180 (1964). The circuit court had distinguished Grace Line from
Seatrain partially on the grounds that the two subsidies involved were not the same.
595 F.2d at 830. The Supreme Court, however, failed to "see the relevance of this
distinction." 444 U.S. at 595 n. 4 0.
122. 444 U.S. at 595.
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V. CONCLUSION
None of the three decisions examined in this Note modifies
Judge Kaufman's well known observation that "the United States
treats its coastwise shipping trade as a jealously guarded preserve.' 1 23 Nevertheless, these cases, while hardly revolutionary in
and of themselves, when taken together undeniably narrow the
grand protectionist design of United States cabotage legislation.
It is now clear that while a renationalized vessel is ineligible
for domestic trade, its parts will not necessarily bar a jumboized
vessel from coastwise participation. The potential, therefore, exists
for a sizeable fleet of partially foreign vessels to ply the domestic
trade. Additionally, United States goods processed abroad can be
shipped back to domestic points on foreign vessels, regardless of
the shipper's intent. As a result, circumvention of cabotage law
looms as a distinct possibility. Finally, upon full repayment of its
construction subsidy, a vessel is eligible for coastwise trade. The
owner of such a vessel is thus afforded the desirable choice of
which trade to pursue depending upon market conditions.

Robert W. Gruendel

123. Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1020 (1970).

